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1. The pros and cons of Korean won internationalisation in the light 
of the recent financial crisis 
Since the late 1980s, Korea has continued making institutional improvements aimed at 
providing the basis for Korean won internationalisation, in order to enlarge its benefits. Faced 
with the recent global financial turmoil, however, the internationalisation of the Korean won 
may be a two-sided coin. In other words, while the need for internationalisation has 
increased, its side effects cannot be underestimated. 
The pros of Korean won internationalisation 
Korean won internationalisation would have various economic benefits. It would enable 
domestic economic agents to avoid foreign exchange risk and save on foreign exchange 
transaction costs, help in the development of domestic financial and foreign exchange 
markets, reduce the need for external payment reserves, and generate seigniorage profits. 
Moreover, given the ongoing global financial crisis, the merits of internationalisation of the 
won may increase further in the long term. 
First of all, if the Korean won were internationalised, the exchange rate risk of private 
economic agents, including exporters and importers, could be reduced. In particular, recent 
events in the Korean foreign exchange derivatives market such as the “knock-in/knock-out 
option”2 and the “snowball” could be better managed. Moreover, importers would not need to 
pass-through the additional costs of currency depreciation to consumers, and thus 
inflationary pressures could be mitigated. 
The second benefit of Korean won internationalisation is that the Korean economy would be 
more resilient to external shocks. For example, issuance of won-denominated overseas 
securities could help to reduce the possibility of double mismatches in currency and maturity. 
In this way, it could effectively respond to sudden capital outflows and strengthen its 
resilience to the shocks. That is, it could reduce the risk of currency mismatch from the 
burden of “original sin” inherent in emerging market economies, which could thus help to 
reduce the side effects of sudden foreign capital flows, such as boom-bust cycles or systemic 
sudden stops in the global financial markets. Moreover, securities issued overseas usually 
have long-term maturities (more than one year), and rollover risk, particularly during periods 
of financial turmoil, would be lessened. 
Third, Korean won internationalisation would improve foreign exchange liquidity conditions 
and enhance the capital soundness in the financial sector. This would also contribute to a 
deepening of domestic financial markets through the introduction of new financial products. 
                                                
1  Deputy Governor, Bank of Korea. 
2  An exotic currency option, named KIKO (knock-in/knock-out), was structured with buying one put option and 
selling two call options. Since 2006, KIKO has been widely used by Korean small and medium-sized 
enterprises for hedging purposes, as it bears no transaction cost. But the firms involved have suffered huge 
losses, as the Korean won has depreciated sharply in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
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In other words, an increase in capital inflows would have a direct and positive impact on 
foreign exchange liquidity. In addition, the capital soundness of domestic financial institutions 
would be enhanced through an increase in the issuance of won-denominated stocks. 
Furthermore, it would promote the introduction of new financial products and facilitate its 
transactions in the market, thereby contributing to the quantitative and qualitative 
development of domestic financial markets. 
The cons of Korean won internationalisation  
Given the ongoing tensions in the global financial market, however, the negative effects of 
Korean won internationalisation would also increase. On top of that, the Korean economy 
would be more easily exposed to speculative attacks if the won were internationalised. Amid 
the turmoil in the global financial market, attaining full liberalisation in the pursuit of currency 
internationalisation could aggravate capital flow volatility, heightening the chance of 
speculative attacks on the won. The speculation would, of course, increase the volatility in 
the financial market, especially in the exchange rate, thereby increasing the uncertainty of 
the whole economy in a country such as Korea, where external dependence is relatively 
high. In particular, the exchange rate could become more volatile if foreign exchange funding 
difficulties and the recession in the real sector were to continue, as in the current situation. 
Furthermore, volatile capital flows into and out of Korea might undermine the autonomy and 
efficiency of monetary policy. Emerging market economies with premature currency 
internationalisation tend to be more vulnerable to external financial shocks, creating 
difficulties for monetary policy. In other words, massive capital inflows increase the cost of 
monetary policy operations and worsen the central bank’s balance sheet in the process of 
sterilisation, while the capital outflows add to the difficulties in coping with the liquidity drain in 
the domestic financial market and squeeze the real sector economy. Additionally, before 
achieving a mature financial market, the large capital flows may cause a distortion in the 
financial market, rather than helping it to develop. 
Overall, despite the various benefits of Korean won internationalisation in the long term, the 
short-term costs of pursuing it at this point in time are relatively large. It should be noted that 
the effectiveness of financial stability resulting from currency internationalisation would be 
limited in the current global financial turmoil where the financial market tensions of advanced 
economies are fast spreading into emerging economies. This reflects the fact that the 
emerging economies that lie somewhere on the scale between developed and 
underdeveloped countries face the greatest likelihood of a potential crisis, rather than 
reaping the full benefits of currency internationalisation. 
2. Evaluating the progress in Korean won internationalisation 
Developments in Korean won internationalisation 
Much progress has been made in Korean won internationalisation, at least in terms of its unit 
of account. Convertibility and exchange of the won, the entry of the won in physical form in 
exports/imports, and won deposits by non-residents have all become liberalised. In current 
transactions, the conclusion of won-denominated transactions, as well as the settlement of 
transactions in Korean won, have also become liberalised (June 1996). In addition, since 
January 2006, the authorisation of most capital transactions involving the Korean won has 
been changed from an approval basis to a reporting basis. In November 2007, the “Plans for 
enhancing the market-friendliness of the foreign exchange transaction system”, which 
include a plan for Korean won internationalisation, were announced. The measures include 
the liberalisation of Korean won exports/imports, the upward adjustment of the amount of a 
non-resident’s borrowing in Korean won from KRW 10 billion to 30 billion, and the settlement 
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of floor capital transactions in overseas exchanges. These areas are considered to have a 
relatively small impact on the foreign exchange market, but are considered essential for 
improving the global acceptability of the Korean won. 
However, internationalisation of the Korean won as a means of payment or store of value 
(borrowing, lending, securities issuance) is not fully permitted, and some of the capital 
transactions must be reported to the government or the Bank of Korea (BoK). In detail, non-
residents’ Korean won borrowings and securities lendings in excess of KRW 30 billion, 
capital transactions between non-residents, and securities issuance by non-residents should 
be reported to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance or the BoK. Additionally, won-
denominated current transactions among non-residents using non-residents’ Korean won 
transaction accounts are prohibited. However, won-denominated current transactions 
between residents and non-residents are permitted, and are available only through non-
residents’ Korean won transaction accounts. The Korean government will pursue mid- to 
long-term measures towards internationalisation more prudently, such as lifting procedural 
restrictions on over-the-counter (OTC) capital trades and won borrowings, and permitting the 
free settlement of capital transactions in the won.  
 
Table 1 
Development in KRW internationalisation by transaction types 
(end-2008 basis) 
Transaction Types Details Extent of Liberalisation 
 Convertibility of KRW Unlimited convertibility of KRW Liberalised 
 KRW exchange KRW exchange in Korea and 
abroad Liberalised 
 KRW exports/imports Cross-border carrying of KRW 
in physical form Liberalised 
 KRW deposits Non-residents’ KRW deposits Liberalised 
Conclusion of KRW-
denominated transactions Liberalised 
 Current Transactions 
Settlement of current 
transactions by KRW Liberalised 
Conclusion of 
transactions 
KRW-denominated fund 
procurement by non-residents 
Report to the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance or the 
BOK required1  Capital 
Transactions 
Payment and 
Settlement 
Settlement of capital 
transactions by KRW 
Permitted within a limited 
scope2 
1  Non-residents report to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance for the issuance of won-denominated securities; 
non-residents report to the BoK for borrowing of over KRW 30 billion.    2  Limited to the payment and 
settlement of domestic securities and futures investments, and the settlement of floor transactions in overseas 
exchanges. 
 
The Korean government has chosen Korean won internationalisation as one of its major 
national goals for the next five years, and has been working on that goal. However, due to 
the recent deepening of domestic and external financial instability, its policy stance has 
shifted to a more prudent approach. As a result, the government announced last October that 
it would postpone indefinitely the second stage of its foreign exchange liberalisation 
measures. 
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Current use of the Korean won in external transactions 
Thanks to institutional improvements, the use of the Korean won has increased steadily for 
every type of transaction, although it is not so frequently used by non-residents, except in 
domestic stock and bond investments. 
First, the exchanging of Korean won (in its physical form) for other currencies has increased, 
due to the increase in overseas travel among Koreans and the entry of foreigners into Korea, 
but the amounts involved are not that significant.  
 
Table 2 
Trends of KRW Imports/Exports  
(hundred million won) 
Transaction Types 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Exports 514 594 1,199 1,406 1,497 1,512 4,062 
Banks 
Imports 43 72 281 248 682 1,161 822 
Exports 5 7 9 7 6 17 14 
Individuals 
Imports 827 559 661 797 837 1,024 736 
Korean tourists abroad1 535 709 883 1,008 1,161 1,332 1,200 
Foreign tourists in Korea1 712 475 582 602 616 644 689 
1  In tens of thousands. 
 
Second, use of the won for the settlement of current transactions,3 such as imports/exports 
and service transactions, has also been rare. The currencies used in current transaction 
settlements (in 2008) ranked from the US dollar (83.8%), to the euro (6.4%), and the 
Japanese yen (6.0%), while the KRW accounted for only 0.1%. 
 
                                                
3  The settlement of current transactions in Korean won is a won-denominated transaction, and is allowed only 
between parties concerned using non-residents’ Korean won transaction accounts. Opening a Korean won 
clearing account under the name of a foreign financial firm is not allowed.  
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Table 3 
Current Transaction by Settlement Currencies in Korea  
(billion dollars, %) 
Transaction Types 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 
USD 
228.4 
(84.9) 
277.5 
(82.7) 
281.8 
(83.8) 
417.1 
(82.0) 
552.1 
(78.1) 
639.9 
(83.3) 
791.8 
(84.6) 
JPY 
21.5 
(8.0) 
29.1 
(8.7) 
28.5 
(8.5) 
46.9 
(9.2) 
48.5 
(6.9) 
53.8 
(7.0) 
61.9 
(6.6) 
Euro – 
6.3 
(1.9) 
19.0 
(5.6) 
34.5 
(6.8) 
46.4 
(7.0) 
59.9 
(7.8) 
65.7 
(7.0) 
Trade 
(A) 
KRW – – 
0.3 
(0.1) 
0.6 
(0.1) 
1.6 
(0.2) 
1.9 
(0.2) 
0.9 
(0.1) 
USD 
55.6 
(78.5) 
73.0 
(80.6) 
74.4 
(78.4) 
108.1 
(79.7) 
137.8 
(79.1) 
173.5 
(81.6) 
201.4 
(80.8) 
JPY 
8.6 
(12.1) 
9.4 
(10.3) 
7.6 
(8.1) 
9.7 
(7.2) 
9.8 
(5.6) 
11.4 
(5.4) 
8.7 
(3.5) 
Euro – 
0.8 
(0.9) 
4.7 
(5.0) 
7.3 
(5.4) 
12.7 
(7.3) 
16.3 
(7.7) 
10.6 
(4.3) 
Services 
(B) 
KRW – – 
0.3 
(0.3) 
0.6 
(0.4) 
1.3 
(0.7) 
2.0 
(0.9) 
0.6 
(0.2) 
USD 
284.0 
(83.5) 
350.5 
(82.3) 
356.1 
(82.6) 
525.2 
(81.5) 
689.9 
(82.8) 
813.4 
(82.9) 
993.2 
(83.8) 
JPY 
30.1 
(8.9) 
38.5 
(9.0) 
36.2 
(8.4) 
56.7 
(8.8) 
58.3 
(7.0) 
65.2 
(6.6) 
70.6 
(6.0) 
Euro – 
7.1 
(1.7) 
23.7 
(5.5) 
41.8 
(6.5) 
59.1 
(7.1) 
76.2 
(7.8) 
76.3 
(6.4) 
Current 
Transactions 
(A+B) 
KRW – – 
0.5 
(0.1) 
1.2 
(0.2) 
2.9 
(0.3) 
3.9 
(0.4) 
1.4 
(0.1) 
 
Third, non-residents’ investment in won-denominated financial products (equities and bonds) 
has been mostly liberalised, and transactions in this area have been very active. Non-
residents’ investments in Korean stocks and bonds increased in volume until 2007. Last 
year, however, they declined sharply due to the global financial crisis. Conversely, Korean 
won deposits and borrowings, and Korean won securities borrowings, have been small. 
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Table 4 
Trend of Non-residents’ Investment By Transaction Type1 
(trillion won, %) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Stock Investment 269.9 (37.1) 273.1 (35.2) 325.4 (31.0) 70.8 (27.4) 
Bond Investment 3.3 (0.5) 4.6 (0.9) 21.7  (2.6) 37.9 (0.4)
Won Deposit and Money Trust 0.3 0.5 0.6 2.5 
Won Borrowings 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Won Securities Borrowings 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 
1  Balances at period ends.    2  Figures in parenthesis are the shares in total market capitalisation (in percent). 
 
Fourth, of Korean won foreign exchange transactions between foreign exchange banks and 
non-residents, non-deliverable forwards (NDFs) and overseas remittances of Korean won 
have increased every year.  
 
Table 5 
Trends of FX Transactions Involving Korean won 
(hundred million dollars) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
NDFs1 26.1 42.2 65.3 94.3 
Remittance of money received from 
selling real estate in Korea2 
0.8 0.6 1.5 0.1 
Overseas remittance of Korean won2 17.1 20.5 25.2 39.6 
1  Volumes of daily transactions (based on new purchases + sales).    2  Based on non-residents’ KRW 
transaction accounts. 
 
Reasons behind the slow progress in Korean won internationalisation 
Despite the government’s efforts to internationalise the Korean won, in line with its foreign 
exchange liberalisation measures, use of the won is still minimal. This is because 
acceptability of the won is below that required for an international currency. This implies that, 
in order for a country’s currency to become internationalised, what is needed goes beyond 
just the institutional overhaul, such as foreign exchange liberalisation; spontaneous overseas 
demand for the currency is also inevitably required. 
I have outlined below a comparison between Korea and other major economies, in terms of 
economic size in trade and production, fiscal soundness, external and internal stability of 
their currency value, degrees of financial market maturity and trade structures. These are 
regarded as key elements for determining the acceptability of international currency. 
First, in terms of economic size, Korea ranked 12th in world trade volume and 13th in GDP 
(2007 basis). Considering that the currencies of Australia, Switzerland and Hong Kong SAR 
– which are smaller than Korea in terms of trade and economic size – are more 
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internationalised, I would say that Korea, to a large degree, meets the conditions for currency 
internationalisation, in terms of its economic scale. 
 
Table 6 
Shares of main countries in world trade and GDP1 
(2007 basis, %) 
 US Japan2 Germany2 Korea Australia Switzerland Hong Kong 
Trade 11.4 4.7 (6.5) 8.5 (7.9) 2.6 1.1 0.0 2.6 
GDP 25.3 8.0 (11.4) 6.1 (5.4) 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.4 
1  Weights in comparison to the world total.    2  Figures in parenthesis show the weights in 1985, when 
currency liberalisation was actively pursued.  
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook. 
 
Second, the fiscal soundness of Korea has been strong in comparison to advanced and 
other emerging economies. The public debt of the Korean government as a percentage of 
GDP is considerably smaller than those of developed countries such as the United States, 
Japan and Germany.  
 
Table 7 
Public Debt1 in main countries 
(2007 basis, %) 
 US Japan Germany Korea Australia Switzerland Hong Kong 
Public Debt/GDP 63.1 195.5 65.0 32.1 8.9 43.5 12.5 
1  Based on general government.debt. 
Sources: IMF, The State of Public Finances (2009); Swiss National Bank; HKMA. 
 
Third, domestic inflation, which shows the internal value of the Korean won, has been 
broadly stable overall since 2000, but has exceeded those of advanced economies such as 
the United States and Japan, as well as Australia and Switzerland. The exchange rate of the 
Korean won against the US dollar, which is an indicator of the external value of the won, has 
been more volatile than those of other major economies’ currencies. It seems to me that the 
won does not fully satisfy the requirements for an internationalised currency, in terms of the 
stability of its value. 
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Table 8 
Price and exchange rate movements in main countries1 
(In per cent) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
US 1.6 2.5 2.0 3.3 3.4 2.5 4.2 -0.1 
Japan -1.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 
EU 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.2 1.9 3.1 1.6 
Korea 4.1 2.8 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 4.0 4.1 
Australia 6.0 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.0 3.7 
CPIs 
Switzerland 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.7 2.4 
Yen/Dollar -11.3 -2.9 8.0 7.2 -1.9 -5.2 -1.2 14.0 
Dollar/Euro -3.0 5.5 19.6 10.0 0.0 0.9 9.1 7.4 
Won/Dollar -12.4 3.2 4.9 4.2 11.7 7.2 2.8 -15.8 
Dollar/ 
Aus. Dollar 
-11.0 5.1 20.0 12.9 3.4 -1.2 11.3 1.6 
FX 
Rates2 
Swiss Franc/ 
Dollar 
0.1 8.5 15.7 8.2 -0.3 -0.5 4.4 10.9 
1  Annual average.    2  Appreciations (+) or depreciations (-) against US dollar. 
 
Fourth, in terms of financial market development, Korea’s domestic financial markets have 
grown steadily, while also becoming more open externally. However, they are insignificant in 
terms of trading volume among global financial market transactions and are qualitatively 
immature with a lack of sophisticated financial products. The daily trading volume in Korean 
stock and the foreign exchange market, as well as the outstanding of the bond market, are 
smaller than those of major advanced economies. In particular, the daily trading volume in 
the foreign exchange market is only one quarter that of Australia, whose economic size is 
similar to Korea. 
 
Table 9 
Main indicators in stock, FX and bond markets  
(hundred million dollars) 
 US UK Germany Japan Australia Switzer-land Korea 
Stock Market1, 2 1,921 115 126 160 19 32 43
FX Market1, 3 10,303 19,834 1,576 2,658 1,599 2,564 406
Bond Market4 251,545 13,842 28,522 94,681 7,525 2,620 18,596
1  Daily average trading volume.    2  Based on January 2009.    3  Based on April 2007, including transactions 
with customers.    4  Outstanding of bonds issued at end-Q3 2008. 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges and the BIS (“Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 
2007”). 
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Fifth, it is generally believed that, the more market dominance a country’s exported goods 
have, the higher the possibility of its currency being used in global trade settlement. Korea 
exports more goods to regional countries such as Japan, China, and Southeast Asian 
countries compared to the United States and Europe. If the Korean won were more 
frequently used for the settlement of regional trade, it would enhance the economic benefits. 
 
Table 10 
Destination of Korea’s exports 
(in per cent) 
 2002 2004 2006 2007 2008 
US 20.2 16.9 13.3 12.3 11.0 
Euro Region 13.4 14.9 14.9 15.1 13.8 
Asian Region 47.6 51.0 51.8 50.8 50.7 
(Japan) 9.3 8.5 8.2 7.1 6.7 
(China) 14.6 19.6 21.3 22.1 21.7 
(South East Asia) 11.3 9.5 9.9 10.4 11.7 
Others 18.9 17.2 20.1 21.8 24.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Korea International Trade Association. 
3. Concluding remarks 
Let me conclude my presentation with suggestions for future policy plans. 
If the Korean won is further internationalised in the long term, we can expect various 
benefits. Especially when the world economy is in financial crisis, as is currently the case, 
domestic businesses and financial institutions would have greater opportunities to secure 
foreign currency funding, and the impact of global shocks would be eased. Nonetheless, 
Korean won internationalisation needs to be firmly grounded on global demand for the 
currency. If we rush to pursue this goal when it remains beyond our power, it might trigger 
the risk of speculative attack and hamper the autonomy of our macroeconomic policy. We 
would therefore need to work prudently towards this goal, paying close attention to domestic 
and global conditions. 
In this respect, it will be important for us to focus our economic policies on preventing 
excessive real economic contraction and promoting macroeconomic stability, thereby 
inducing a natural improvement in the acceptability of the Korean won in the medium to long 
term. Implementing further institutional measures for foreign exchange liberalisation and 
Korean won internationalisation would have to be pursued conservatively, taking into 
consideration the progress in global financial market normalisation and the recovery of the 
domestic economy.  
In times of global crisis, such as the current one, we need to further strengthen regional 
currency and financial cooperation in order to establish a foundation for Korean won 
internationalisation and to maximise its potential benefits. The consolidation of Asian regional 
cooperation, together with that between advanced and emerging market economies, such as 
the Korea-US currency swap agreement, would serve as an engine for recovery in 
overcoming a global economic recession.  
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To help achieve this, it will be necessary to create efficient ways of promoting the increased 
use of regional currencies in trade settlement, and of expanding the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) 
to help further develop Asian bond markets. The volume of Korea’s trade with China and 
Japan accounts for 19.6% and 10.4%, respectively, of its total trade. However, the use of 
those countries’ currencies in Korea’s trade settlement is small, due to a less developed 
hedging market for exchange risk. We therefore need to review the measures to facilitate 
trading in the won/yen futures market and the possibility of introducing a won/renminbi 
futures market, making progress towards the establishment of spot markets for those 
currencies. 
In addition, we need to work to lower the possibility of currency crises due to unstable global 
capital flows and currency mismatches, while also promoting internationalisation of regional 
currencies. We can do both of these by fostering the further development of Asian bond 
markets by, for example, expanding the demand for regional bonds through increasing the 
size of the ABF. Last February, the Korean government decided to lift the withholding tax 
levied on foreigners when they invest in Korean bonds, thereby expanding the demand for 
Korean won bonds. 
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